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Bolivian Customs Reform: A Case Study of Consolidating Democratic Institutions
Working paper
Anthony Lanyi, Walter Guevara, Sarah Bell
November 2000 |
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Corruption in the Bolivian customs — largely in the form of bribes to officials to overlook undocumented imports or to allow false documentation or undervaluation — has been rooted in the prevalence of contraband trade and the siphoning off of public funds for political party costs. Bolivia has had since 1982 a constitutionally elected government, and funds for political party costs. Under pressure from international agencies, customs reform was undertaken as a pilot project for a broader National Integrity Plan.
Despite previous attempts at reform, Customs was deeply corrupt in 1999. Customs reform was pushed by the IMF and World Bank, on whose financial assistance the government depends, plus a formal private sector seeking greater regional and global competitiveness, and leading politicians eager to make their mark in the anti-corruption area. With the passing of the new Customs Law in mid-1990, and the appointment of an honest, non-partisan Executive President of the Customs, the reform got underway by first removing the informal, party-appointed Customs agents and enforcing nepotism provision of the new law. Further steps included replacing the entire staff of the Customs through competitive procedures, computerization of operations, and establishing stronger internal controls and policing.
Successful initiation of the reform has demonstrated the importance of top-level political support, backing by public opinion informed by a free press, support from international donors, and creating strong, independent leadership for a reforming agency. Obstacles to continued reform include poor coordination with the Ministry of Finance (which still has serious governance problems), weak support from an as yet unreformed judiciary, and the need for stronger backing by the army and police. |
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| Last updated on: 3/23/2006 |
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